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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GILBERT LORETTO, 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No, 981831-CA 
v. : 
HENRY GALETKA, Warden, : Priority No. 3 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief filed pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that all of 
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred because he could and 
should have raised them on his direct appeal? 
The Court reviews for correctness the legal conclusions 
underlying the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction 
relief. Wright v. Carver, 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Former rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is attached 
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as addendum A.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged petitioner with being a party to an 
aggravated robbery (R. 396) . A jury convicted petitioner as 
charged, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to the 
statutory five-years-to-life prison term (R. 398). This Court 
affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. State v. Loretto, 
slip. op. 960622-CA (attached as addendum B). 
Petitioner challenged the conviction in a petition for post-
conviction relief (R. 1-72). The trial court dismissed the 
petition without a hearing, finding all of petitioner's claims 
procedurally barred (R. 455-56) (attached as addendum C). 
Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 458-59). 
Pursuant to petitioner's request, this Court has accepted 
his Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief as petitioner's 
brief on appeal.2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State detailed the historical facts in its brief on 
direct appeal. Because they have little relevance to this 
xAs a result of amendments subsequent to the filing of the 
petition in this case, rule 65C now provides for the relief 
petitioner sought. 
2A11 references to "Appellant's Brief" refer to this 
memorandum. 
2 
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appeal, respondent will not repeat them here. 
In his direct appeal, petitioner raised five challenges to 
his conviction: 1) the trial court should have quashed the jury 
panel based on a prospective juror's voir dire comments about 
Mexican gang members; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support 
his conviction as an accomplice to an aggravated robbery; 3) the 
trial court erroneously gave repetitious aggravated robbery 
instructions; 4) the trial court gave an improper reasonable 
doubt instruction; and 5) the trial court erroneously denied 
petitioner's motion for a continuance. State v. Loretto, slip 
op. 960622-CA (Utah App. August 14, 1997. The Court rejected all 
five claims in an unpublished decision. Id. 
In his petition and amended petition for post-conviction 
relief, petitioner attacked his aggravated robbery conviction on 
the following grounds: 1) the prosecutor allegedly withheld 
police reports of interviews with the co-defendant; 2) the 
prosecutor allegedly presented false or misleading testimony; 3) 
the State produced insufficient evidence to establish that 
petitioner acted as an accomplice; 4) the State subjected 
petitioner to selective prosecution; and 5) the State used an 
impermissibly suggestive photo identification procedure because 
he was the only person in the photo array with a spider tattoo on 
his neck (R. 17-70, 353-63). Petitioner offered no explanation 
why he did not include these claims in the direct appeal. 
3 
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Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, contending that 
the claims were procedurally barred because petitioner could have 
raised them on direct appeal and had neither alleged nor 
established unusual circumstances for his failure to do so (R. 
394). Petitioner did not respond to the motion, and the post-
conviction court granted it (R. 455-56). 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition. In this 
appeal, petitioner claims: 1) a prospective juror's statements 
about Mexican gang members tainted the entire panel; 2) the State 
produced insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
participating in the aggravated robbery; 3) the trial court 
erroneously gave an Allen instruction; 4) the trial court -refused 
a jury instruction that presented his theory of the case; 5) the 
trial court erroneously denied his counsel's requested 
continuance; and 6) the trial court and jury were biased. 
Appellant's Brief at 5-13. In addition, petitioner alleges for 
the first time that his trial and appellate counsel performed 
deficiently in handling his sufficiency and biased court and jury 
claims. Appellant's Brief at 1-5, 9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that all of petitioner's 
claims were procedurally barred. Petitioner offered no 
justification for failing to raise them on direct appeal. 
Consequently, he failed to meet his burden to show that unusual 
4 
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circumstances justified hearing his post-conviction claims, and 
the trial court correctly applied the procedural bar. 
On appeal, petitioner has established no error in this 
ruling. To the contrary, petitioner relies on claims he never 
presented to the post-conviction court. Raising claims on appeal 
that he did not raise in the post-conviction court does not 
establish that the lower court erroneously found the claims 
before it procedurally barred. 
ARGUMENT 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AND 
PETITIONER'S RELIANCE ON CLAIMS HE NEVER RAISED IN THE 
POST-CONVICTION COURT AND ON CLAIMS ALREADY REJECTED ON 
THE DIRECT APPEAL DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE CONTRARY 
The trial court correctly concluded that petitioner's claims 
were procedurally barred. Utah law clearly precludes using a 
petition for post-conviction relief to raise claims that could 
and should have been raised on direct appeal. See, e.g., Webb v. 
Van Der Veur, 853 P.2d 898, 899 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). A petitioner may avoid this procedural bar 
by establishing that unusual circumstances excuse his failure to 
raise the otherwise barred claim in the direct appeal. Id. 
The petition included no excuse for petitioner's failure to 
raise his post-conviction claims on direct appeal (R. 1-71). 
When respondent moved to dismiss the petition because 
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred, petitioner again 
5 
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failed to come forward with any justification for failing to 
raise the claims on direct appeal (R. 453 (October 21, 1998 
minute entry indicating that petitioner filed no response to 
respondent's motion to dismiss)). On this record, the post-
conviction court correctly concluded that all of the claims were 
procedurally barred and correctly dismissed the petition. 
On appeal, petitioner identifies no error in this ruling. 
Instead, petitioner belatedly alleges that his counsel performed 
deficiently on his direct appeal (Appellant's Brief at 1-5, 9) 
and abandons all but one of the claims he raised in his post-
conviction petition in favor of claims that he already litigated 
in his direct appeal (Appellant's Brief at 5-13).3 
Petitioner alleges for the first time on appeal that his 
counsel performed ineffectively. Admittedly, prior counsel's 
constitutionally deficient performance may avoid the procedural 
bar. See, e.g., Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 615 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 516 U.S. 828 (1995). However, petitioner cannot 
wait until his post-conviction appeal to argue ineffective 
assistance of counsel in order to avoid the procedural bar 
enforced by the court below. Cf., e.g., Edgell v. Canning, 97 6 
P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999) (refusing to address an issue raised 
for the first time on appeal). 
3The only claim included in both the petition and appeal is 
petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
6 
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In any event, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are facially meritless. In order to establish that 
counsel performed deficiently, petitioner must identify specific 
acts and omissions by counsel that fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and overcome a strong presumption that 
counsel performed reasonably. See, e.g., Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 521-22 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
Petitioner's arguments do not satisfy this burden. 
Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for not 
raising a sufficiency claim in the direct appeal. Appellant's 
Brief at 5. The argument misstates the record. Appellate 
counsel raised a sufficiency claim in the direct appeal, and this 
Court rejected it. State v. Loretto, slip op. 960622 at 2 (Utah 
App. August 14, 1999). 
Petitioner's other two ineffectiveness claims appear to 
allege that he was denied his right to conflict-free counsel. In 
order to succeed on this claim, petitioner must establish both 
that his appellate counsel had an actual conflict of interest, 
and that the conflict affected her performance. See, e.g., State 
v. Lovell, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999). Petitioner has 
established neither part of this test. 
In order to establish that an actual conflict existed, 
petitioner must establish that counsel had to make choices that 
would advance her interests over petitioner's. Id. Petitioner 
7 
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first faults his counsel for not raising his claim that he was 
tried before a biased judge and jury (Point VI). Appellant's 
Brief at 5. In support, petitioner alleges only that his trial 
and appellate attorneys' role as officers of the court would make 
them reluctant to raise the claim. Id. 
Petitioner's allegation is frivolous. If petitioner's 
allegation established a conflict of interest for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, all defense counsel would have a conflict of interest 
because all counsel serve the dual function of advocate and 
officer of the court. 
As to his sufficiency claim, petitioner contends "it is 
quite possible that the ineffective representation of Mr. Loretto 
was caused by the fact that the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
association is curtailed by the State government from fully and 
zealously representing defendant because of loyalties owed to the 
Third (3d) Parties (e.g. the Prosecution Council and the Utah 
Department of Corrections)/' Appellant's Brief at 9 (emphasis 
added) . This allegation merely speculates about possible divided 
loyalties. It does nothing to establish that counsel in any way 
advanced her interests to the detriment of petitioner's 
Petitioner also has not shown that any conflict affected his 
counsel's performance. Admittedly, counsel did not raise on 
direct appeal a that petitioner was tried before a biased judge 
and jury. However, petitioner offers nothing other than his mere 
8 
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conclusion that the omission resulted from an actual conflict of 
interest,4 
Petitioner similarly fails to establish that any conflict 
affected how counsel presented the sufficiency claim. To the 
contrary, petitioner merely repeats the same sufficiency argument 
in this appeal that his counsel made on the direct appeal. 
Appellant's Brief at 7-9. 
Petitioner also grounds his appeal on five claims that he 
never presented to the post conviction court.5 Raising new 
claims on appeal does not establish that the post-conviction 
court erroneously found that the claims presented to it were 
procedurally barred. 
Moreover, all the claims petitioner raises in this appeal 
are clearly procedurally barred; the substance of each was fully 
and fairly litigated on the direct appeal. A petitioner may not 
re-litigate in a post-conviction petition issues that the Court 
has already disposed of on direct appeal. See, e.g., Wright v. 
4To support this claim, petitioner refers back to the other 
five claims he raised on this appeal. Appellant's Brief at 9. 
As detailed below, counsel raised the substance of all five of 
those claim on the direct appeal. 
DThe petition did not include petitioner's appellate claims 
that: 1) a prospective juror's comments about Mexican gang 
members tainted the panel (Point I); 2) the trial court gave an 
Allen instruction (Point III); 3) the trial court refused an 
instruction on petitioner's theory of the case (Point IV; 4) the 
trial court should have granted petitioner's requested 
continuance (Point V); and 5) the trial court and jury were 
biased (Point VI). 
9 
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Carter, 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994); Webb v. Van Der Veur, 853 
P.2d at 899. This Court already rejected petitioner's claims 
that prospective juror Bingham's comments about the dress of 
Mexican gang members tainted the jury panel, that the State 
produced insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and 
that the trial court erroneously denied a requested continuance. 
State v. Loretto, slip op. 960622-CA (Utah App. August 14, 1997). 
The Court rejected the substance of petitioner's Allen 
instruction claim on the direct appeal. In Point III, petitioner 
contends that the trial court erroneously gave "verdict urging 
*Allen' instructions." Appellant's Brief at 9. "When a jury 
informs the trial court that they are having difficulty agreeing, 
the court may underscore the case's importance, urge the jury to 
reach an agreement, and send them back for further 
deliberations." State v. Clements 967 P.2d 957, 959 (Utah App. 
1998) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)). 
However, such instructions are appropriate only if, in context, 
they are not coercive. Id. 
Clements clarifies that the analysis is triggered only when 
the jury announces that it is deadlocked, or, at least, having 
difficulty reaching a verdict. Id. Petitioner does not argue 
that the jury in his criminal trial made such an announcement. 
Instead, petitioner merely repeats the argument the Court already 
rejected that the trial court erroneously gave more than one 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
aggravated robbery instruction. Appellant's Brief at 9-11. 
Similarly, the Court rejected the substance of petitioner's 
claim that the trial court refused to instruct on his theory of 
the case. In Point IV, petitioner asserts that the trial court 
erroneously declined a "reasonable alternative" instruction. 
Appellant's Brief at 11-12. Petitioner presented this same 
argument on direct appeal as part of his contention that the 
trial court gave an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction. 
Specifically, petitioner argued that his proffered "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" instruction better defined reasonable 
doubt (R. 434-37). The Court rejected petitioner's challenge to 
the reasonable doubt instructions. State v. Loretto, slip- op. 
960622-CA at 2. Re-badging already litigated and rejected claims 
does not revive them for purposes of post-conviction relief. 
Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d at 616 ("the attempt to avoid a prior 
ruling by a hair-splitting distinction in the statement of the 
issue does not invoke Rule 65B or habeas jurisdiction"). 
Finally, petitioner's claim that he was tried before a 
biased judge and jury also fails. To support that claim, 
petitioner merely refers to other claims in his current appellate 
brief. Appellant's Brief at 13. Those claims are procedurally 
barred because they were fully and fairly litigated on direct 
appeal. Petitioner cannot obtain merits review of a claim that 
is merely derivative of procedurally barred claims. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Because petitioner offered no justification to the post-
conviction court for omitting his post-conviction claims from the 
direct appeal, the post-conviction court correctly applied the 
procedural bar and correctly dismissed the petition. On appeal, 
petitioner has established no error in applying the procedural 
bar. Therefore, the Court should affirm the dismissal of the 
petition. 
im 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZA day of \^A-Xr 
JAN GRAHAM 
httoje&ey General 
S^ BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
12 
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Rule 65B UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 222 
granted. Birch Creek Irrigation Y. Prothero, 
858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Inunctions sion of water by municipal corporation or pub-
§§ 10,14, 48 to 52,69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303, lie utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426. 
310 to 316. Preliminary mandatory injunction to pre-
OJ.S 43 CJ.S. Injunctiona H 8,16,22 to vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting 
24, 36 et seq.; 43A CJ.S. Injunctions SS 165, practices, 49 A.LR.3d 1239. 
166, 180, 206, 208. What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying 
AJLR. — Infant's employment contract, en- .refusal to honor, or injunction against honor-
fbrceability of covenant not to compete in, 17 ing, letter of credit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2), 
A.L.R 3d 333. 25 A.L.R.4th 239. 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or Recovery of damages resulting from wrong-
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448. fill issuance of injunction as limited to amount 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, of bond, 30 A.L R.4th 273. 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject Right of employee to injunction preventing 
to, 33 A.L.R.3d 589. employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480. 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from Propriety of federal court injunction against 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831. 
question, 38 AX.R.3d 572. Key Numbers, — Injunction *• 9 et seq., 
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver- 143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority)* There shall be no special form of writ. 
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
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223 UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts en the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the 
presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been abjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be per-
mitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of lie case. Upon motion 
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for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally chargecl. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has 
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of 
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
abjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
abdicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to 
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the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of 
the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent 
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a 
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances re-
quire, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to ap-
pear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An 
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has re-
strained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person 
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the 
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re-
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court or-
ders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and 
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person hav-
ing custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct 
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall 
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the 
petition, if enough iB stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, 
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who 
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if 
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by an-
other or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
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brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has refused the petitioner the use or eiyoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This role 
represents a complete reorganization of the for* 
mer rule. This rule also revises parts of the 
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and 
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies gen-
erally to proceedings that are necessitated by 
the absence of another plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the court. After the rule's in-
troductory paragraph, each subsequent para-
graph is intended to deal with a separate type 
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals 
with proceedings involving wrongful imprison-
ment; subparagraph (c) deals with proceedings 
involving other types of wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty; paragraph (d) deals with pro-
ceedings involving the wrongful use of public 
or corporate authority; and paragraph (e) deals 
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of 
judicial authority or the failure to exercise 
such authority. To the extent that the special 
procedures set forth in these paragraphs do not 
cover specific procedural issues that arise dur-
ing a proceeding, the normal rules of civil pro-
cedure will apply. 
This rule effectively eliminates the concept 
of the "writ" from extraordinary relief proce-
dure. In the view of the advisory committee, 
the concept was used inconsistently and 
confusingly in the former rule, and there waa 
disagreement among judges and lawyers as to 
what it meant in actual practice. The concept 
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing 
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FILED 
AUG 1 H 1997 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Case No. 960622-CA v. 
Gilbert Loretto, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
F I L E D 
(August 14, 1997) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Lisa J. Remal and Rebecca Hyde, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Orme. 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This court has determined that lf[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and 
the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO QUASH JURY PANEL 
In some cases, there exists a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice, which requires the prosecution to prove the defendant 
was not prejudiced. See, e.g.. State v. Swain. 835 P.2d 1009, 
1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). However, in this case, Loretto bears 
the burden of showing that prejudice resulted from the rather 
confusing statements made by Ms. Bingham during voir dire. 
Although defendant has offered an interpretation of Ms. Bingham's 
statements in conjunction with a theory of how they could have 
prejudiced him, we conclude that defendant has not shown that Ms. 
Bingham's comments prejudiced him, especially in light of the 
jurors1 response to the trial court's subsequent voir dire. We 
therefore reject Loretto1s challenge to the trial court's denial 
of his motion to quash the entire jury panel. 
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SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Loretto and the third man flanked the armed man in the 
group. Each man stood only a foot away from Flores in the dark 
parking lot, in this formation, the three men stood close enough 
to Flores to grab her if she tried to escape. The position of 
each of the men suggests a planned confrontation, or at least a 
concerted effort by all three men to rob Flores. As such, we 
conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, is not "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Loretto, with the 
necessary mental state, encouraged or intentionally aided the 
armed man in the commission of the robbery. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-202 (1995); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 
1993) . 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY INSTRUCTION 
Instruction 13 requires the State to prove that the conduct 
with which Loretto was charged was prohibited, and thus explains 
why the next two instructions define what constitutes prohibited 
conduct. Instruction 16 gives the statutory definition of 
accomplice liability. Instruction 17 and 18 then clarify that 
the jury must only consider Loretto1s role in the robbery and 
that Loretto1s mere presence was not enough to convict him of 
accomplice liability. Thus, when the instructions are read 
together, they do not overemphasize the elements of robbery or 
detract from the issue of whether Loretto was an accomplice. 
Instead, the instructions accurately state the law and emphasize 
to the jury what it must find for Loretto to be guilty on a 
theory of accomplice liability. 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
This court and the Utah Supreme Court have specifically held 
that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case is "an 
appropriate statement of Utah law." State V, Robertson. 932 P.2d 
1219, 1232 (Utah 1997); State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328, 1332 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In addition, in Robertson, the supreme 
court specifically rejected the argument that the trial court 
instead should have presented the jury with an instruction that 
included a generalized reference to a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis. See 932 P.2d at 1233. Therefore, based on stare 
decisis, we reject Loretto1s argument. £&£. State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 399 n.2 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115, 115 
S. Ct. 910 (1995). 
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DENIAL OF MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
Loretto has never met his burden of establishing on the 
record that the sought-after witness could be produced or that 
the witness's testimony was relevant. See state v. Linden. 761 
P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, Loretto has never even 
established that the potential witness's testimony would be 
helpful to Loretto. As a result, Loretto has not shown that he 
"was materially prejudiced by the [trial] court's denial of the 
continuance or that the trial result would have been different 
had the continuance been granted." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 
474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, we conclude that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Loretto's 
motion for a continuance. See fftate v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 
413 (Utah 1993) (stating appellate court will not reverse trial 
court's denial of motion for continuance absent clear abuse of 
discretion). 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
^Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Orme, Judge 
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ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 E. 300 S. ,6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
PILEP HISTRICT COURT 
T H , ! * - • -CAL DISTRICT 
NOV 1 2 »98 
t: S A L T I S K E ^ U ^ ^ ' 
BY DEPUTY CLERK J . S \ « ^ — * - -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT LORETTO, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 970910469 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court on respondent's 
September 18,1998 motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did 
not respond to the motion to dismiss. After reviewing the file, the Court concludes as 
follows: 
1. A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal 
and cannot be used to circumvent regular appellate review. A petitioner waives issues that 
could have been raised on direct appeal from a conviction unless the petitioner establishes 
unusual circumstances that justify the failure to previously raise them. 
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2. Petitioner could and should have raised all of his current issues on 
direct appeal, and has failed to allege or demonstrate unusual circumstances which justify 
his failure to do so. Accordingly, petitioner's post-conviction claims are procedurally 
barred. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted. 
2. The petition is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this / ^ ~ d a y of November, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOE 
Third District Court . ""• ~'J 
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I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing unsigned 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF postage prepaid, 
this_t3G-T5ay of October, 1998, to: 
Gilbert Loretto #25347 
Utah State Prison 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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